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Recent spectacular increases in worldwide food prices has led some critics to assign 
blame for this phenomenon to speculators in commodity futures markets, especially index 
funds, for having caused increased price volatility in commodity futures and spot. 
This thesis addresses the question of whether speculation or hedging activity in the corn 
and soybean futures markets are responsible for increases in the futures price volatility in 
these markets.  Theoretical reasons for each view are examined.  In addition, this 
question is addressed empirically, while controlling for economic factors that may also 
affect futures price volatility. The effect of speculative and hedging activity in these 
futures markets upon the spot market price volatility is also studied. Since volatility may 
be caused by trading, but volatility may also attract traders, the empirical relationships 
are studied using Granger Causality tests. The empirical research is based on new and 
modified data on traders’ positions made available by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission which allows for a more accurate classification of traders as speculators or 
hedgers. The results are inconsistent with previous empirical research that blames 
speculators for increases in agricultural commodity prices for both the spot and futures 
market. In contrast, the results show that hedgers tend to increase the volatility of corn 
futures’ prices, thus lending support to the theory of hedging pressure. Only processors 
and merchants change their positions in the corn futures market upon increases in the 
futures price volatility, which indicates that this market is mainly used for hedging 
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purposes while speculators in the soybean futures market tend to increase their positions 
in response to an increase in futures price volatility. Finally, the futures positions of no 
single trader category could be used to predict future price volatility movements across 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
  
In 2006, new and interesting headline news started appearing in major media sources 
all over the world. It did not involve threats of nuclear attacks, presidential elections, or 
major social revolutions; rather it was simply about the impact of rising food prices on 
household consumers, especially in developing countries. In June 2008, mass protests 
occurred in India, Mexico, Yemen and certain parts of Africa over the dramatic increase 
in grain prices that occurred since 2006. At the same time, children were marching in 
Egypt and Haiti to call attention to child hunger and malnutrition. Also, the FOA (Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the UN) announced that 36 countries are in crisis due to 
higher food prices and will require external assistance (World Bank, 2008). In developed 
countries food is a small portion of household consumption (10-15%), but in developing 
countries, it could reach 40% or more (Von Braun 2008). Large fluctuation in prices will 
have serious consequences in these countries and could lead to worldwide riots and 
threaten economical and political stability.  
The drastic increase in food prices over the period 2006-08 coincided with large 
inflow of money in the commodity futures market by long-only commodity index funds. 
Index fund investment increased from $90 billion dollars in January 2006 to  $200 billion 
dollars in December 2007 (Barclays 2007) mainly because influential studies proved that 
investing in long only  commodity index funds would provide diversification benefits for 
portfolio managers (e.g. Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2006). Also, low transaction costs and 
liquid contracts made commodity futures very appealing for speculators and hedgers 
alike. 
Due to the size and scope of commodity index funds transacting in the futures market, 
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a worldwide debate erupted concerning their role in driving up commodity prices.  
On one hand many economists and policy makers blamed index traders. They 
recommended position limits, and more transparency in commodity markets in order to 
limit speculation. In response to almost 4,670 comments provided by academics, traders, 
advisors, producers and futures market participants concerning the rapid increase of long-
only investments, the CFTC (U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission) started 
publishing supplemental notes that broke down the position of index traders for all 
agricultural commodities in 2007. The report was labelled Commodity Index Traders 
report (CIT). Moreover, the CFTC announced in a meeting in September 2009 that it 
would provide more transparency to exchange traded futures by classifying traders into 
four different categories in the newly released DCOT report (Disaggregated Explanatory 
Notes) which are: 1) Swap Dealers (SD), who deal in commodity swaps and use the 
future markets to manage or hedge the risk of the swap transactions; 2) Money Managers 
(MM), who manage and conduct futures trading on behalf of investors; 3) Producers and 
Processors (PM), who have actual positions in the spot market and use the futures market 
in order to manage the risk of these positions and; 4) Other Reportable Traders (OR) who 
are not included in any of the above three categories but possess large enough positions 
to be classified as reportable traders. 
If speculation is positively correlated with volatility, then it could be partially 
responsible for the rise of basic food prices worldwide.Although some level of 
speculation could be beneficial to the market since speculators provide liquidity, 
excessive speculation that increases volatility will have detrimental effects on producers. 
These producers face many risks in the production and marketing of these commodities. 
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The most important one is price risk, since it makes planning for long-term investment to 
increase yield or improve quality rather difficult. Usually large producers will use some 
sort of hedging as a mean of decreasing the variation in return. However, small and 
medium producers are less likely to hedge and are thus more vulnerable to price changes 
which could have detrimental effects on their production capacity and lead to huge 
decrease in the supply of agricultural crops. This leads to the question of whether 
speculation was one of the main reasons behind the last tremendous agricultural price 
spike or blaming speculators is just another historical misconception concerning traders 
who make mysterious gains through dealing in goods which they have no interest in 
producing or purchasing. This historical and social resentment towards the speculator is 
best described by an incident in the 1860’s when traders on Wall Street sold gold short on 
rumours that the government would sell some of its surplus. This knocked down gold 
prices considerably and lead to Lincoln’s famous quote: “I wish every one of them had 
his devilish head shot off.” (Mc Clure 1879). 
On the other hand, several studies rejected the hypothesis that speculators drove price 
increases in commodity futures and concluded that fundamental factors are the main 
drivers of higher prices. Recent price volatility in commodity futures could be explained 
using different factors such as the increase in demand by emerging countries, especially 
China and India, which enormously increased their consumption of commodities over the 
last decade and had a substantial 9% real GDP growth between 2000 and 2006 (Von 
Bauren 2008). 
Another possible explanation is that the rise in food prices coincided with an 
enormous increase in commodity prices led by energy and metals (Gilbert 2010) which 
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was similar to the 1973-1974 commodity price booms in the sense that it occurred in 
enormous world liquidity in futures markets resulting from huge US trade deficits and 
loose monetary policies.  
Also, the demand for crops such as corn, soybean and feedstock used in bio-fuel 
production is a major contributor to the food prices increase (Rose-grant et al, 2008). The 
tradeoff of food versus fuel puts upward pressure on food prices and correlates 
agricultural commodity prices to that of oil.  
The last fundamental factor that could explain the rise of agricultural prices is the 
depreciation of the US dollar which is the main currency of all commodity trading. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
After presenting a summary of the debate on what drives commodity prices, the 
following section presents the research objectives of the paper. 
 First of all, the impact of speculation on price movements in agricultural futures has 
been studied extensively in the literature. However, to our knowledge, the relation 
between the level of speculation and volatility in the corn and soybean futures market has 
not been studied extensively. All previous work has focused on the causal relation 
between the level of speculation and futures price movements.  
Corn was chosen because it is the most widely produced feed grain in the United 
States, which produces 40% of the world’s harvest. Corn is mostly used to produce corn 
oil, starch, beverages and fuel ethanol. In addition, the U.S. accounts for 20% of the 
world exports of corn. Soybean is the second most widely produced crop in the U.S. with 
a value of 38 billion dollars in 2009/10 and accounts for 90% of total U.S. oilseed 
production (USDA 2010). The significance of the two commodities implies that their 
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prices would be closely followed by regulators, and producers. Also, derivatives on these 
commodities would be traded extensively and would be liquid.  
 Our first objective is to study the relation between the volatility of the corn and 
soybean futures contracts and the level of speculation in each market using the new 
and modified Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) data made available 
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) which allows us to more 
accurately classify traders as speculators and hedgers for the period 2006-2010.  In 
order to classify traders as hedgers or speculators, we will use the methodology of De 
Roon et. al (2000) and modify it in order to match the new classification we have for 
the DCOT data. We will use a class of stochastic processes known as generalized 
autoregressive conditional hetroscedasticity (GARCH) and exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) in order to analyze causality for all the variables discussed in the paper.  
 The second objective would be to test whether traders that are classified as hedgers 
have any impact on the volatility of the contracts. Hedgers have actual positions in 
the spot market and use the futures market in order to manage their risk. Speculative 
positions, unlike hedging positions, are limited by the CFTC in terms of how many 
net long or short contracts can be held on each exchange. However, hedgers can apply 
for exemptions and large producers place huge short positions in order to better 
manage their production risk. We believe that there could be a significant relation 
between hedging positions and changes in volatility of the two contracts. This 
provides a counter argument to the existing one. 
 Third, we would test whether a relation exists between futures trading activities of 
speculators and hedgers and the volatility of the spot market. If such a relation exist, 
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then traders are partially responsible for increasing prices of basic commodities and 
diminishing the purchasing power of poor consumers, thus increasing worldwide 
income disparity and economic inequality. Also, we will test for the alternative 
hypothesis of whether the volatility of the spot market leads that of the futures.   
 A multivariate model that controls for basic fundamental factors is used to test the 
above three objectives. Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is employed 
by pooling the two regressions together since it will lead to statistical accuracy 
especially when the error terms across the equations are correlated.  
 Lastly, the new data allows us to test using a pooled Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) whether or not each trader category could be used to predict the subsequent 
volatility of the two futures contracts in the sense that traders could be labeled as 















1.2 Contribution,  Hypotheses and Implications of The Research  
The main contribution of the thesis is that it allows us to test whether speculation and 
hedging affect the spot and futures price volatility of corn and soybean. To our 
knowledge, this relation has never been studied before. Moreover, the more 
comprehensive and detailed DCOT data has not been used previously to test for hedging 
and speculation effects. We believe that the classification offers a superior procedure of 
classifying traders as hedgers or speculators.  
Also, previous studies tend to test for causality using a bivariate model. We will use a 
multivariate model that includes the basic effect of supply and demand upon the spot 
market and cost of carry and convenience yield for the futures market. We believe that 
estimating the cost of carry and convenience yield are important because differences 
between contemporaneous spot and futures prices are explained using interest lost in 
storing a commodity, warehousing costs, shipping and insurance costs, and a convenience 
yield on inventory which will be modeled using an exchange option (Kocagil 2004).  
Furthermore, the new data will allow us to examine whether each trader category in the 
new classification could lead to changes in the volatility of the contracts. Although the 
methodology used in this section is already discussed in Sanders et al. (2004), the new 
data allows us to further divide commercial and non-commercial classifications used in 
the COT report. As well, the period of 2006-2010 was characterized by more volatility in 











1. Speculation will lead to higher volatility in both markets. Although empirical results 
produce contradicting results, I would expect that speculation will lead to higher 
volatility during the period of study since it is characterized by large positions of 
swap dealers (discussed later in detail). 
2. Hedging decreases the volatility of the spot market since it allows producers and 
merchants to transfer risk to other market participants. 
3. Traders are trend followers thus hedgers will increase their short positions and 





Our findings could have significant implications for consumers, practitioners and 
policy makers. If futures trading activity of speculators or hedgers are found to cause 
price volatility of our futures contracts and the commodities, then policymakers should 
try and devise ways to try and limit these effects since they lead to tremendous effects on 
household purchasing power throughout the globe. If speculation was found to be 
significantly related to spot price volatility, then policymakers could impose tougher 
trading restrictions or position limits. Also, if hedgers are partially responsible for the 
increase, then perhaps the CFTC should reexamine its classification procedure for traders 
and maybe require stricter rules for classifying traders as hedgers since some speculators 
might have the motive to classify themselves as hedgers in order to bypass trading 
restrictions.   
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Moreover, it would be very appealing to practitioners to know whether any of the 
four traders’ categories have any significant predictive power and could signal market 
continuation or reversal and could be translated into profitable trading strategies. Also, if 
volatility tends to lead traders’ positions in corn and soybean future contracts, then this 























Chapter 2 Literature Review  
 
2.1 Link between speculation, hedging and price movements 
The impact of speculation, principally long-only index fund investment, has been a 
hot debate in commodity research. It is commonly believed that speculative buying 
created a bubble and commodity prices far exceeded fundamental values over the period 
of our study. Before summarizing the bubble debate, we will start by reviewing earlier 
papers that dealt with the level of speculation in agricultural futures. Peck (1981) 
examined changes in the degree of speculation for corn, wheat and soybean using 
monthly data from 1974 to 1977.  Her main finding was that increase in the trading range 
is related to a decrease in speculation. Peck used a monthly average of daily trading 
ranges as a measure of price variability and  concluded that speculation has a large 
impact on market return.  
The recent boom in commodity prices led to extensive research on the relation 
between the level of speculation and prices, in an attempt to provide evidence on the 
question of whether the sharp increases in prices were due to a bubble. Gilbert (2009) 
studied price movements in three agricultural (wheat, corn and soybeans) futures, metal  
(aluminum, copper and nickel) futures and crude oil futures for 2006-2008. Using 
Granger causality tests between lagged index fund investment and price changes, the 
author found a statistically significant relationship between the two for crude oil, copper 
and aluminum but weaker evidence for grain futures. However, his main results indicated 
that index funds’ investments in futures lead to significant price changes in only 3% of 
the sample over the period 2006-2008. 
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Stoll and Whaley (2009) used weekly data to study the relation between long-only 
index fund investment and price changes for all 12 futures markets included in the COT 
report. Also, Granger causality tests indicated that commodity index investing did not 
cause any futures price movements.  
Sanders, Irwin and Merrin (2008) studied the adequacy of speculation in agricultural 
futures contracts in the period 2004-2008. Their main finding was that Working’s T, 
which is a measure of speculation first introduced by Working (1960) was still within its 
historical range and that the number of short hedging positions were increasing at a 
higher rate than long hedging positions. The authors inferred that long-only investments 
provided overall liquidity for hedgers and any limitation on the participation of index 
fund investors would lead to a major liquidity shock in the market. 
Sanders and Irwin (2010) studied the impact of index and swap funds on commodity 
futures markets. They studied the relation between futures returns and traders’ positions 
using cross-sectional tests rather than a regression analysis of time-series. Their study 
failed to find a relation between returns and traders’ position. Empirical results provided 
little evidence that long-only positions affected returns in various commodity futures 
markets.  
The most cited paper that blamed index traders for the recent boom in prices is that of 
Masters and White (2008). They found a correlation between large investment of index 
funds and price variation and blamed the tremendous increases in commodity prices on 
institutional investors’. They recommended regulatory actions in order to limit 
speculation through re-examining speculative position limits and eliminating index 
speculation. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee investigation related to the CBOT wheat 
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futures market reached a similar conclusion as that of Masters and White in the sense that 
excessive speculation by index traders was one of the major reasons for the tremendous 
price fluctuation. They recommended restricting index traders to 5000 contracts, and 
conducting more investigations into the effect of index fund trading in other agricultural 
markets. 
An alternative theory that could explain price movements would be that hedgers’ 
positions might be correlated with movements in futures prices. Hedging pressure theory 
dates back to Keynes (1930). It focuses on risks that hedgers face due to market frictions 
such as high transaction costs or information asymmetries. Chang (1985) studied the 
extent to which net hedgers’ and speculators’ positions are related to price movements in 
agricultural futures contracts using monthly CFTC data. He found that both hedgers’ and 
speculators’ positions affect prices in the sense that prices rise on average in months in 
which speculators hold enormous long positions and hedgers hold short  positions, and 
concluded that a risk premium for the level of speculating and hedging should be 
included in the futures prices.  
In order to better determine the futures risk premium, De Roon et al. (2000) presented a 
model which implied that the futures risk premium depended on market and cross-market 
hedging pressure.  Their main result was that the futures risk premiums in 20 futures 
markets classified into four different categories: financial, agricultural, mineral and 
currency were correlated with their hedging pressure variables constructed from the 
CFTC data. Hedging pressure had a significant effect on futures returns after controlling 
for market risk and price risk. An interesting result was that the authors found that 
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hedging pressure effects were also significant in explaining the spot return for the 
corresponding markets.  
2.2 Fundamental Factors 
In an attempt to explain recent prices using fundamental factors, Cooke and Robles 
(2009) used a time series model to test for factors that affect agricultural commodities’ 
prices. These factors included ethanol and biodiesel production, exports, and imports, 
prices of crude oil, and fertilizers, and the U.S. dollar-Euro exchange rates as a proxy for 
the U.S. dollar depreciation, as well as proxies for speculation. 
 Considering corn and soybean, the results indicated that while only oil prices were a 
significant factor for corn, for soybean, oil prices were significantly negatively related to 
prices, export and the U.S. dollar-Euro exchange rate were positively related to prices. 
The study used Granger causality to test for the effect of above factors on commodity 
prices. 
Other papers dealing with the topic used graphs and theories to explain the factors 
that affected agricultural futures prices. The most cited ones are Abbott et al. (2008) and 
Mitchell (2008) which emphasized the effects of rising demand in countries such as 
China and India, increases in ethanol production, increased oil/fertilizer prices leading to 
higher costs of production for producers and devaluation of the U.S. dollar, since most 
commodities are priced in U.S. dollars. The Euro exchange rate seemed to have the 
dominant effect since only the U.S. and Europe used these two commodities for biodiesel 
and Europe imported 70% of the total U.S. corn exports. 
Roach (2010) used a spline-GARCH model to test the relation between volatility and 
spot prices for six commodities. His sample included both corn and soybean markets and 
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ranged from 1875-2009. The author claims that it is helpful to separate volatility patterns 
into low and high frequency components. High frequency volatility included weather and 
pest shocks and uncertainty about expected harvest while low volatility can be defined as 
changes in the level of price variability which persist for more than one year. His main 
result was that low frequency volatility is positively correlated across different markets. 
Also, U.S. dollar exchange rate variability and U.S. inflation volatility were the two 
variables that explained a large part of the rise in volatility since mid-1990s. 
2.3 Relation Between Futures and Spot Markets 
The issue of whether the introduction of futures markets lead to less variability in 
cash market prices is debatable. In an interesting article, Jacks (2007) argued that the 
introduction of futures markets would lead to lower commodity price volatility using a 
rational expectations model with storage and futures markets. The author showed that 
higher spot market volatility existed before the introduction of futures exchanges using 
indices for 16 major agricultural, and metals markets.  
Antoniou and Holmes (1995) studied the impact of trading of the FTSE-100 stock 
index futures contract on the volatility of the spot market using daily closing prices for 
the period 1980-1991and reported that futures trading increased the volatility of the 
underlying spot market.  
Darrat et.al (2002) studied the role of index futures trading upon spot market 
volatility for the S&P 500 using exponential GARCH (EGARCH) to model spot and 
futures price volatilities for the period 1987-1997. Their main finding was that futures 
trading did not lead volatility in the spot market; rather, there was strong evidence to 
support the alternative hypothesis that spot volatility led that of the futures market.  
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2.4 Traders’ Positions 
 
Sanders et al. (2004), using Granger causality tests and data from the CIT report, 
examined whether a relationship existed between traders’ positions and market price 
movements for the following contracts: crude oil, unleaded gasoline and natural gas 
futures. Using traders’ positions for 1992 to 1999, they found that positive futures returns 
led to an increase in noncommercial net positions in the following week, while long 
commercial positions decreased after a futures price increase.  The interesting part in this 
paper is that they tested for the effect of non-reporting traders, for which the CFTC 
provide no information to whether their positions are for hedging or speculative purposes. 
They also focused on the idea that non-commercials were true speculators while 
commercial positions need not be for hedging alone. This point will be discussed in detail 
in the methodology section. Another major result was that traders’ positions did not lead 
market returns and should not be used as an independent indicator of market returns. 
Wang (2001) constructed a sentiment index based on traders’ positions in six 
agricultural futures markets in order to study whether these positions could predict 
futures price movements. If a relation were found to exist, then this could be useful in 
timing the market. The sentiment index was constructed using total open positions and 
included net long open positions, and historical maximum and minimum aggregate 
positions. The author concluded that speculators’ positions were a price continuation 









Chapter 3: DATA 
3.1 CFTC Data for Corn and Soybean Futures Markets 
Traditional COT reports provide a breakdown of each Tuesday's open interest for 
markets in which 20 or more traders hold positions equal to or above the reporting levels 
established by the CFTC. Open interest is divided under reporting and non-reporting 
trader categories. Reporting traders’ positions are divided into commercial long and short 
and non-commercial long, short, and spreading positions. Non- reporting traders’ 
positions are divided into long and short positions. The COT has a major drawback in the 
sense that there is an incentive for speculators to try and classify their activity under 
commercial hedgers in order to bypass position limits (CFTC 2009). 
In order to address these issues, the CFTC started publishing the Disaggregated 
Commitments of Traders (DCOT) report under which reporting traders’ positions are 
classified under those of swap dealers, managed money, processor and merchants, and 
other reporting traders. Positions are divided into long, short and spreading. The last 
simply indicates that traders take long and short positions in the same contract but with 
different futures contract maturities. Swap Dealers (SD) are entities that deal in swaps for 
a commodity and use the futures markets to manage or hedge the risk of the swap 
transactions. Money Managers (MM) are engaged in managing and conducting futures 
trading on behalf of investors. Producers and Processors (PM) have actual positions in the 
spot market and use the futures market in order to manage their risk, while Other 
Reportable (OR) includes positions which are not included in one of the above three 
categories but are large enough to be reported. Weekly Data were collected from the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for the period of June 2006- 
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September 2010 for a total of 225 observations. This sample represents all available data 
that provides a better classification of traders. 
3.2 Spot and Futures Price Data 
Daily spot and futures prices for corn and soybean were collected from Datastream 
for January 2006 to September 2010. The following led to 1,230 observations. In order to 
match daily data with the weekly data provided by the CFTC, the two files were merged 
using Tuesday prices. For soybean spot prices, 5 daily observations were missing, of 
which only 1 was Tuesday prices. In order to adjust for that, the price of the day before 
was used as a proxy for Tuesday’s price. The same procedure was used to adjust for two 
missing Tuesday corn prices.  
Insert Figure 1 
Insert Table 1 
 
Figure 1 graphs weekly spot and futures prices over the period 2006-2008. From 
figure 1, it is apparent that most of the price increases occurred in the period 2006-08. 
Table 1, which provides characteristics of spot and futures prices, as well as other 
variables used in the analysis, shows that prices over this period were very volatile for 
both markets, with corn futures trading between 220 and 750 cents/bushel and soybean 







3.3 Convenience Yield and Storage Costs 
Brennan (1958) and Tesler (1958) show that inventory owners have benefits from 
holding stores of a commodity, such as the ability to profit from temporary shortages of 
the commodity and to maintain a stable production process, which are not available to 
holders of futures contracts.   
 Gibson and Schwartz (1990) argue that this concept has been empirically shown to 
be one of the drivers of the relation between futures and spot prices for agricultural 
commodities. Another factor which influences future prices is the cost of carry, which 
includes storage costs, transportation costs, insurance and interest rates. The cost of carry 
model expresses futures prices as a function of spot prices: 
                                                                                                                   (1) 
F: futures prices, S: Spot price, sc: storage cost and c: convenience yield, t represents the time 
to delivery of the futures contract. 
Storage costs for both contracts are collected from the CME rulebook. These include 
a premium for insurance on the crops stored at authorized facilities. Barge rate data 
collected from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are used as a proxy for 
weekly transportation costs. Three month T-bill rates from the Federal Reserve statistical 
releases are used to calculate interest forgone on storing the commodity. 
In order to estimate the convenience yield associated with corn and soybean, we will 
use an exchange option model proposed by Kocagil (2004) which will be discussed in 
detail in the methodology part. The estimation requires two sets of future prices that are 




3.4 Other Control Variables 
Economic factors that have been shown to affect spot prices are used as control 
variables in the spot volatility regression. These factors include net exports, oil prices and 
the Euro-U.S. dollar exchange rate.  
Net Exports: Weekly data on the net shipment is collected for both markets from the 
USDA. Since the U.S is a major worldwide exporter of both commodities, the data 
collected are indicative of huge positive net exports. From Table 1, it is apparent that 
exports are huge, with corn exports being on average double the exports of soybean.  
Oil: Average weekly crude oil spot prices collected from Bloomberg are used to control 
for the effect of oil and biodiesel production. Biodiesel production data is only available 
monthly and since there is a high correlation between oil prices and biodiesel production, 
we believe that oil prices could represent that effect. Also, oil is directly related to 
production and transportation costs. During the period of 2006-2008, oil prices fluctuated 
between 41.50 and 149.50 dollars a barrel. 
Euro-U.S. dollar exchange rate: Since previous research showed that the depreciation 
of the U.S. dollar directly affected the prices of agricultural commodities, we will use the 
Euro-U.S. dollar exchange rate as a proxy for that depreciation. Daily exchange rates are 
collected from Bloomberg.  
The sample consists of 1,230 observations for daily spot and future prices and 225 





Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Calculation of Speculative and Hedging Indices 
As previously mentioned, the speculative and hedging indices will be based on the 
theoretical model of De Roon et al. (2000) which used the COT data to examine hedging 
pressure in 20 futures markets. They defined hedging pressure as the difference between 
commercial short and long positions divided by the total positions of reporting 
commercials. The data is provided under reporting and non-reporting positions. Two 
issues arise when using the CFTC data. First, a major drawback of this analysis is to 
assume that all commercials are hedgers and all non-commercials are speculators. Also, 
we should match commercials and non-commercials positions to the new DCOT data. 
The CFTC provides supplemental notes that are used to construct hedging and 
speculative indices from reporting positions by using the following equation:   
                                                                                    (2)        
                                                               
                                                                 (DCOT)                                   (3) 
 
In September 2008, the CFTC launched a report on the characteristics of the swap 
dealer positions. They concluded that swap dealers correspond closely to index funds in 
agricultural futures (CFTC, 2008b) but not in metal or oil; thus there is minimum error in 






Also we will follow the methodology of De Roon et al. (2000) and use the percent net 
long positions held by non-commercials to represent the speculative index. Hedging and 
speculation are estimated by the following equations: 
                                                   
         
          
                                                           (4) 
    
                                 
                                                           
            (5) 
 
                                                                     
                                                                    
       
A major concern is the method used to allocate the positions of non-reporting traders. 
In our methodology, we will follow the procedure of Sanders et al. (2008) and allocate 
the non-reporting traders’ positions to swap dealers, managed money, processors and 
merchants, and other reportable traders, using their respective weights of total reporting 
traders. 
Table 1 shows the mean for the hedging and speculative index constructed from 
equation 4 and 5. The degree of hedging is around 53% for soybeans and 50% for corn, 
while the degree of speculation is around 40% for both.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Table 2 is divided into three panels. Panel A shows the average position size by 
category. Managed money long positions are around three times as big as short positions. 
Processor and merchant positions are mostly concentrated in short positions while swap 
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dealers have an enormous difference between average positions for long and short with 
short positions around 8,700 contracts and long positions around 327,000 contracts. This 
clearly indicates that compared to the CIT report, this category represents long only index 
investments.  
Panel B provides the average position size by trader. We decided to include that in 
order to observe the significance of traders in each category. An interesting observation is 
that for managed money, other reportable, processor and merchant categories, the traders 
seem to have similar number of contracts for long and short. The major difference is in 
the swap dealers’ category in corn futures, who hold on average 10 times more long 
contracts than short.  
Panel C shows the percent of long and short positions for each category. Although the 
average swap dealer holds enormous positions, their overall percentage of long positions 
is not overwhelming. Based on the fact that swap dealers hold around 1% of all short 
positions, we can infer that this category is similar to long-only index investments and is 
classified as speculators. Also, as expected, traders classified as processors and merchants 
hold around 80 % of all short positions. However, this category holds 25% of total long 
positions which implies that processors and merchants may not be pure hedgers but rather 
tend to try to earn some profit by assuming long positions. Note that processors and 
merchants could apply for exemptions from speculative position limits on futures 
exchanges and thus a motive exists for traders to try and classify their activities under the 
category of processors and merchants. Also, the fact that processors and merchants hold 
most of the short positions and a significant part of the long positions could lend support 




4.2 Calculation of Convenience Yield and Storage Costs 
A factor which influences future prices is the cost of carry which includes storage 
costs, transportation costs, insurance and interest rates. A series of assumptions will be 
made in order to estimate the cost of carry. First, we assume that all delivered grains are 
No.2 for corn and soybean, since delivering other grades is accepted by exchanges; 
however, it results in a premium or discount based on the quality delivered. Second, 
delivery on futures contracts will take place on the first trading day of the deliverable 
month for corn and soybean which will be used as a proxy in order to estimate storage 
days and cost. The daily storage cost includes a premium for insurance on the crops 
stored at authorized facilities. According to Irwin et al. (2009), 15 million bushels of corn 
and 10 million bushels of soybean are shipped monthly through the Illinois delivery 
facilities. Therefore, Saint Louis-Illinois facilities will be used as a proxy for the shipping 
destination, since these facilities account for most of the shipping certificates issued from 
the CME.   
There are three methods of transporting corn and soybean which are: railroad, trucks 
and barge. The U.S. Grain Council (2008) estimates that barge transportation is the 
cheapest for exporting grains and provides easy access for 80% of U.S. corn production. 
The USDA issues weekly barge rate quotes which represent the cost of transporting a 
short ton of grain from a specific origin to a destination. Several barge rate indexes exist, 
however, along the Mississippi River system, and the destination is not specified and 
could be anywhere between Baton Rouge and New Orleans, including South Louisiana. 
As of August 2005, these three ports served as a gateway for about 55 to 70 percent of all 
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exported corn and soybean (North American Export Grain Association, 2006).   
We will use the above barge rate index in order to estimate transportation costs.  
Storage costs = storage costs at authorized facilities + transportation costs + interest 
foregone 
Storage costs are almost identical for corn and soybean with averages of 7.5 and 6.5 
cents/bushel respectively.  
 
Early theoretical work (Brennan, 1958) and empirical work (Fama and French, 1987) 
on the convenience yield assumed that shortage in the spot commodity would lead to a 
positive convenience yield and thus to an inverse relation between convenience yield and 
the amount of inventory. However, recent work implies that convenience yield could be 
modelled using a call option (Heinkel et al. 1990). Our method of estimating convenience 
yield is consistent with Heinkel et al. In order to estimate the convenience yield that 
accrues to owners who have benefits from holding the spot commodity, such as the 
ability to profit from temporary shortage and maintain a stable production process, the 
method used by Kocagil (2004) is employed.  
First, assume that at time    a producer has to choose between selling now and waiting 
till time     . The decision is based on the expected future spot price and carrying 
costs. Thus, the inventory holding decision resembles a financial option. In order to 
decide whether to store the commodity or to sell it right away, Kocagil uses future prices 
that are five month apart. In our estimation, the following data was collected from 
Datastream and Bloomberg and it includes an intra commodity spread under which a 
trader is long one futures contract and shorts the other. The approach assumes a short 
position in the March contract and a long position in the September contract. Also, May- 
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December is used as a proxy for the intra commodity spread when the weekly futures 
price is for the delivery month of March or September. The daily convenience yield is 
estimated as the value of an exchange option where the holder has the right but not the 
obligation to exchange the spot commodity for a futures contract with a future delivery 
date.  
The closed form solution for the exchange option can be represented as: 
                                                         )                                        (6) 
where      
   
  
  
           
   
,                       
    
            
     = cumulative normal distribution; T is the time to maturity and       are distant and 
current future prices which follow a Brownian motion with volatilities       and 
instantaneous correlation  . Note that the option value is independent of the interest rate. 
Basically, convenience yield is the value of exchanging the distant futures contract with a 
contract that has a shorter maturity.  
Results of equation 6 are shown in table 1 which indicates that the convenience yield 
for corn is around 40 cents/ bushel which is 10% of the average corn future prices. For 

















4.3 GARCH Model to Estimate Conditional Variance  
After calculating the speculative indices, we estimate the volatility of the futures 
contracts for the two markets using GARCH (1, 1) or EGARCH models, which are well 
known conditional variance models and are time series techniques used to model serial 
dependence in volatility. A first look at the data allows us to detect the presence of 
volatility clustering which is the first motivation for GARCH models. In order to test for 
this, we will conduct the Engle (1982) test on the residuals of the estimated model in 
order to test whether these classes of models are suited for our data. First, a linear model 
is used to estimate the residuals, which are then used to regress squared residuals on a 
constant and p lags of residuals. We chose a p-lag = 5 since it represents a weekly data of 
observations. All results from the Engle test on raw returns indicate that the GARCH 
families of models are suited for our data. The results are shown in table 3 for GARCH 
(1, 1). The mean and variance equations are represented below: 
                                                  
                                                
             
         
                            (7) 
 
The second equation indicates that conditional variance is the sum of three functions: 
a constant term      an ARCH term from the previous period:     
  and the last period 
forecast of variance     
 . 
GARCH (1, 1) imposes restrictions on parameters such that                       





4.4 E-GARCH Model to Estimate Conditional Variance 
When any of these assumptions are violated, we will use EGARCH to model 
volatility. EGARCH was initially proposed by Nelson (1991) and could be represented as 
follows: 
                                  
  =                 
 ) +    
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                     (8) 
                                       Asymmetry effect 
 
The model has two major advantages over GARCH. First, log variance is used in a 
sense that parameters’ values are not restricted to positive values as in GARCH. Also, the 
asymmetry effect measures the relation between volatility and returns in a sense that a 
negative relation between return and volatility will lead to a negative   (Brooks 2008).  
A normal distribution for the error terms is assumed in estimating the GARCH model 
using maximum likelihood techniques. Since our data exhibits non- normality as seen 
from Bera- Jarque statistics provide in Table 1, and researchers on financial time series 
data found that the normality assumption is violated even after accounting for conditional 
heteroscedasticity, we will use the Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML) proposed by 
Bollersev and Woolbridge (1992), under which the variance- covariance matrix estimated 
is robust to non-normality. The technique is similar to the method of maximum 
likelihood, except that the function which is maximized is not the log-likelihood function 
corresponding to any actual probability distribution, but is instead fit using generalized 
linear methods (GLM). Therefore, QML is consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed and is a compromise estimation method although it is closer to maximum 
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likelihood estimation than to the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
Since GARCH models are non-linear, QML is employed in order to estimate the 
residuals. Employing QML alters the estimated covariance variance matrix but does not 
affect the parameter estimates which are optimized using conditional likelihood functions 
which are calculated by maximizing the function below: 
    
 
 
                   
 
 
   
   
 
     
 




 Berndt et al. (BHHH, 1974) uses first derivatives of the likelihood function in order 
to optimize the log-likelihood function with respect to the parameter values at each 
iteration. We will employ the Marquardt method, a modified version of BHHH which 
calculates first and second derivatives thus better estimating optimal values. To ensure 
flexibility, we allow up to 12 weekly autoregressive lags. The number of lagged GARCH 
is estimated using the sign bias t-test. Results prove that no misspecification exists for 
any variable. Results for EGRACH model are found in table 4 and show that there is a 
positive effect of leverage in a sense that an increase in return will lead to an increase in 
volatility.  
After estimating the parameters, the Ljung-Box test is conducted on the residuals in 
order to estimate whether a higher order autocorrelation exists at lag k=12.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Table 3 provides the parameters for the variables that satisfy the restrictions, as well 
as, the Log likelihood value from optimizing the equations. As we can see, six variables: 
oil spot, euro, soybean futures and spot, corn spot and futures provide a good fit for the 
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model in equation 7  and satisfy all the restrictions for GARCH (1,1). As expected, all 
lagged GARCH coefficients are significant with large values and the sum of lagged 
squared error and lagged conditional variance is very close to unity implying that shocks 
to conditional variance will be persistent. No visible autocorrelation exists in the 
residuals for all variables, as measured by Ljung Box test statistic. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
Table 4 shows the parameter estimates for the EGARCH model.    shows that the 
ARCH term is significant for most variables. The relation between volatility and return is 
negative and highly significant as measured by   implying that an increase in volatility 
leads to a decrease in return. 
As a robustness test, we will use exponentially weighted moving average instead of 
all the EGARCH volatilities estimation and run all regressions again. The results on the 











4.5 Unit Root Tests 
After calculating the conditional volatility for all the variables included, we conduct a 
unit root test on each set of data. A unit root tests whether     in the following 
equation: 
                                                                                                                              (9) 
Wher     : each variable in turn             
    implies that the data contains a unit root. Now, if a unit root does exist for any 
variable, then the observations are non-stationary, and we run a cointegration test on the 
errors terms to examine the long run relationship between the errors terms for the two 
variables. Only stationary models will be used to make accurate estimates and 
interpretations. For example, if the model is non-stationary, then the t test statistic will 
not follow a t-distribution and inferences about p-values will be inflated.  
A unit root test is conducted using an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) time series 
regression and Kwaitkowski et al. test (KPSS).  ADF uses p lags of the dependent 
variable. The issue in this test is that there is no clear consensus on how to determine the 
number of lags. We will use the Akaike information criterion in order to estimate the 
number of lags. Using lags of    will absorb any dynamic structure present in the 
dependent variable to ensure that    is not correlated. 
In econometrics, a long run relationship implies that the variables have converged to 
some long term value and thus it is impossible to conclude whether several variables will 
have a long term relationship. Different critical values are used, since the residuals have 
been constructed from a set of coefficient estimates and the sampling estimation error in 
those coefficients will alter the distribution of the t-statistic. We will use the critical 
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values proposed by Dickey-Fuller.  
KPSS is assumed to be stationary under the null, and uses residuals from the OLS 
regression of    on the exogenous variable   . Lag length for KPSS are calculated using 
the Newey- West (1994) automatic bandwidth selection method. Brooks (2008) argues 
that failure to reject the null could be due to insufficient information or because the null 
was correct. A solution to this would be to use a stationary test (KPSS) and a unit root 
test (ADF). For the results to be robust, we should reject HO (ADF), do not reject HO 
(KPSS) or vice versa. Table 3 and 4 shows that all variables are stationary on the basis of 
ADFF and KPSS and thus we can confidently proceed with testing our hypotheses using 
















4.6 Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
In order to test our hypotheses, we can estimate our model using OLS. However, the 
error terms across markets are correlated for the equations for any two variables and since 
we have similar variables in both equations, the power of the test could be increased by 
modeling the equations below as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions. SUR was 
introduced by Zellner (1960) and it accounts for hetroscedasticity and correlation in the 
error terms. It is a generalization of OLS for a multi-equation model. The first step in 
SUR is to compute an initial OLS regression to compute residuals which are used to 
estimate the cross equation covariance matrix. The second step is to estimate the 
parameter based on the estimated error from the first equation using feasible GLS which 
provides the best unbiased estimation of the parameters. SUR estimates the following 
model: 
                                                                        (10) 
                                                                 (11) 
 
                                                                                              
                                                                                                  
    : Euro/US dollar exchange rate. 
 
As we already mentioned, the above equation allows us to test the relation between 
the volatilities of corn and soybean futures contracts and the level of speculation and 
hedging using the new and modified DCOT data. Also, we will be able to determine if 
futures trading activities leads to an increase in the volatilities of the contracts and thus 
are partially responsible for the increase in worldwide prices.  
In the next section, we will explain the methodology for checking whether each trader 
category is useful in predicting subsequent market volatility.  
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4.7 Granger Causality 
Most research, that tries to test whether a relation exists between traders’ positions 
and return on the contracts, uses a bivariate Granger causality. Granger causality tests 
how much of Y could be explained by previous values of Y and then observe whether the 
explanatory power improves by adding lagged values of X. We will test for two way 
causation. The method could be represented by the following equations: 
                                                                                                  (12) 
                                                                                              (13) 
                                                                              
Although the purpose of our paper is to examine whether speculation and hedging 
affects the volatility of commodity futures, we will examine whether an opposite relation 
exist between volatility and speculation. If volatility leads speculation, then this could be 
explained by the fact that speculators tend to prefer more volatile markets in which 
potentially higher returns could be obtained. The first equation tests whether volatility 
leads traders’ positions by testing the null hypothesis that volatility does not lead changes 
in positions (          . We are interested in examining how each group of traders 
change their positions related to changes in volatility of the contracts. The second 
equation tests whether movements in traders’ positions are useful in predicting changes in 
the contracts’ volatilities. If they are, profitable trading strategies could be developed for 
the two contracts. However, this is beyond the scope of this research and our aim is just 





Wang (2001), Sanders et. al (2004), and (Irwin et al. 2010) studied the relation 
between traders’  futures positions and return for commodities and suggested estimating 
each equation across markets in order to increase the power of the test. This is done by 
using a procedure similar to that described in the previous section. We will follow the 
same methodology as described in the previous section, but positions will be divided 
between PM, SD, OR and MM. The data for each trader category is used to test our 
hypothesis using seemingly unrelated regression adjusted for hetroscedasticity. An issue 
would be to choose an appropriate lag for the model and we choose the one that 















Chapter 5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Effect of Speculative and Hedging Activities on Contracts’ 
Volatilities 
Insert Table 5 
Insert Table 6 
 
The results of the analysis of equations 10 and 11 shown in table 5 which allows us to 
study the impact of Hedging and Speculating Indices simultaneously on corn spot and 
futures. First of all, the lagged volatility of spot prices is highly significant and positively 
correlated to the futures market volatility in both corn and soybean markets. An 
explanation would be that investors tend to hedge volatile spot prices through increasing 
their trading in the futures market which is consistent with De Roon et al. (2000) and 
Darrat (2002) who found evidence that hedging volatile spot markets involves cross-
market hedging. We do not assume that our results are representative of all agricultural 
commodities since we only tested two markets. The fact that lagged futures returns 
increases spot volatilities for both markets is contradictory to our hypothesis  that futures 
markets allows efficient transfer of risk between participants. Our result does not give a 
clear answer to the question of whether spot price volatility or futures price volatility 
destabilizes the other. However, we can conclude that both volatilities for corn and future 
are highly integrated and thus move in the same direction mainly because these markets 
are linked by the actions of arbitrageurs.  
The volatility of storage costs for corn futures is highly significant and is the only 
variable that explains changes in volatilities. This could be due to the fact that the costs of 
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storing corn depends on barge rates and most importantly on interest forgone 
(opportunity cost) on the investment in the corn. The volatility of the convenience yield 
does not affect that of corn futures prices, mainly because the volatility of the 
convenience yield tends to be very small when compared to the volatility of the other 
factors. The volatilities of net exports and the Euro-U.S. dollar exchange rate are not 
significant. The only control variable which is statistically significant is the volatility of 
oil for both corn and soybean spot price volatility as shown in Tables 5 and 6. This is in 
line with expectations, since oil prices affect production input costs, transportation costs 
and the demand for bio-fuel production. Our results for the corn market for the effect of 
the volatility of fundamental factors upon the volatility of spot prices are similar to that of 
Cooke (2009) who found that only oil prices are significant of all the basic supply and 
demand factors affecting the corn market.  
In addition, the rise and fall in agricultural prices over the period 2006-08 was 
parallel to the sharp swings in crude oil prices over the same period. Therefore, it could 
be that the more heavily traded and followed crude oil market could have led to major 
fluctuations in prices of agricultural commodities. Gilbert (2010) provided a similar 
argument in the sense that tremendous increases in food prices coincided with an 
enormous increase in commodity prices led by energy and metals. 
The major part of this research is to test whether speculation and hedging in both 
markets affect the volatilities of spot and futures prices.  First, the speculative index 
constructed decreases the volatility of corn futures and is positively related to that of the 
spot market. However, both results are insignificant. This adds to the empirical evidence 
which indicates that speculators are not responsible for the last food price crisis and thus 
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speculative trading by swap dealers, managed money and other reportable traders has no 
effect on volatilities, which is identical to the results of Stoll and Whaley (2009) 
concerning the relation between speculation and futures returns. This could be due to the 
fact that speculators have position limits set by exchanges and thus their trade impact is 
minimal. Also, this rejects the argument that greedy investors are to be blamed for price 
increases and are indirectly responsible for putting downward pressure on household 
consumption all over the world. Moreover, this lends support to the fact that speculators 
facilitate hedging needs by providing liquidity and transfer of risk from producers and 
merchants. Our results contradict the common belief among producers and policy makers 
that speculators in futures markets destabilise the volatility of spot prices and are 
indirectly responsible for decreasing social welfare increasing economic disparity. 
Although blaming speculators is appealing to societies and policymakers, our empirical 
results provide support to the classical view that speculators make prices more efficient. 
 
On the other hand, hedgers’ positions tend to affect both spot and futures price 
volatilities for the corn market. Our hedging index tends to be positively related to futures 
price volatility and negatively related to the spot price volatility (Table 5). The fact that a 
positive relation exists between hedging and the volatility of corn futures prices implies 
that hedgers in this market put pressure on volatility through increasing their hedging 
demand when volatility increases. This could be explained by the fact that traders 
classified as producers and merchants hold 82 % of the total short positions and thus they 
tend to hedge volatile spot markets through increased involvement in the futures market. 
This result is similar to Bessembinder (1992) and De Roon et.al (2000), who found that 
38 
 
hedging demand is an important determinants for future returns. 
One interesting result is that changes in hedgers’ positions decrease the volatility of 
the spot market, which implies that hedgers’ trading improves liquidity in the spot market 
and rejects the hypothesis that future markets destabilize prices and volatility of the spot 
market. For the corn market, we can conclude that the futures market allows efficient 
transfer of risk for producers and merchants, which allows them to hedge their positions 
efficiently and to decrease the volatility of the spot prices.  
Hedging and speculative indices for the soybean market tend to be insignificant. The 
differences between the two markets could be due to the fact that the corn futures market 
is three times bigger than the soybean futures market, or the fact that position sizes by 
trader is much larger, especially for swap dealers and managed money (Table 2). 
Sander’s et al. (2004) discussed this issue by stating that practitioners and researchers 
should be aware that empirical results using COT data in one market do not imply similar 
results in another. This leads to a major concern to be acknowledged in this paper which 
is the construction of our speculative indices as well as the classification of traders as 
hedgers or speculators. Based on the data provided by the CFTC and previous research, 
we can conclude that our classification and methodology is accurate. However, this does 
not eliminate the possibility that better classification, transparency and restrictions on 
traders will provide different results. Many hedgers speculate and many speculators 
hedge. There is no clear consensus on traders’ behaviours in commodity markets, or the 
motivation for their trades. The fact that recent views on speculators tend to ignore 
classic research such as that of Working (1960) and Peck (1980), which states that all 
commercial firms speculate on market movements and price direction, is absurd. We tend 
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to analyze our results taking into consideration the fact that producers and merchants tend 
to have huge long positions which is contradictory to the fact that these traders are 
expected to be pure hedgers. This point is acknowledged by the CFTC when it classifies 
traders by categories. We feel that classifying traders by categories is misleading and a 
better understanding of commodity markets is feasible if the CFTC classifies traders as 


















5.2 Relation between Traders’ Positions and Price Volatilities  
 
Insert Table 7 
 
As we already mentioned, the CIT data allows us to further divide traders into four 
categories. Although an extensive body of empirical work regarding the impact of traders 
on futures returns exists, there is no empirical work on traders’ positions and market 
volatility for agricultural futures.  
Although we used a multivariate model that includes control variables in the first part, 
we will only test for causality between volatility and traders’ positions by using a 
bivariate model. The point in this section is to see how each traders group changes its 
positions relative to the futures price volatility and whether traders’ behaviour impacts 
the volatility of the two contracts. 
The results of the analysis of equations 11 and 12 are shown in table 7 which shows 
the results of the tests for causality using Granger causality. Sanders et al (2004) and 
Wang (2001) argued that estimating the model as an SUR system across markets will 
provide more robust results. In interpreting the results, we will only focus on categories 
where both the short and long positions are affected by the futures price volatility. Panel 
A of Table 7 tests whether futures price volatility leads traders’ positions. It is interesting 
to observe if traders alter their positions based on changes in the futures price volatility. 
Hedgers should increase their short positions and speculators might increase their long 
positions or short positions in response to an increase in the futures price volatility. 
 Processors and merchants tend to decrease their long positions and increase their 
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short positions after an increase in volatility for the corn futures market. This implies that 
the corn market is mainly used for hedging risk for producers in the sense that traders are 
mainly concerned with decreasing their exposure to risk. Also, processors and merchants 
are trend followers in a sense that they will increase their positions after volatility 
increases to face higher concerns of price swings.   
Results for the soybean market are included in panel B of table 7. In this market, 
swap dealers both long & short and managed money long positions are positively related 
to volatility. These traders are also trend followers since speculators increase their 
positions in volatile markets in order to gain higher economic profit or because of a sense 
of over confidence that the market is turning in their direction. It should be noted that the 
period under study was characterized by a boom in prices. 
There are two important points to note for Panel A: First, other reportable trading 
positions that are classified as speculative tend to decrease their long positions and 
increase their short positions with increases in the futures price volatility for corn, and 
increase their short positions for soybean, thus acting like hedgers in both markets. This 
could be due to the fact that these positions include those of some hedgers. However, if 
this is true, then those traders will try to be classified as hedgers in order to face fewer 
restrictions by exchanges. Another explanation would be that this class of traders are 
contrarian or negative feedback traders. 
Second, processor and merchants tend to increase their long and short positions after 
an increase in futures price volatility for soybean market. The fact that traders in soybean 
future market increase their long positions could imply that hedgers might include some 
speculators. This could explain the difference in our results for the two markets and is an 
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issue that requires further research since there is a chance that speculators might be 
classified as hedgers by exchanges. The results indicate that the corn futures market is 
mainly used for hedging while traders in soybean act differently. This could be due to the 
fact that the soybean market is much smaller and maybe would be easier to manipulate. 
Panel B of Table 7 tests whether traders’ positions lead volatilities. This is very 
important since it allows us to check whether traders’ positions are useful in predicting 
future volatility in the market and could be used as an indication for agricultural futures 
market movement, as well as provide basic insights for developing profitable trading 
strategies based on their positions. Results for both markets indicate that all categories of 
















Chapter 6 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we test whether traders’ positions classified as speculative or hedging, 
using new and modified DCOT data provided by the CFTC could explain changes in the 
price volatilities of corn and soybean futures contracts. Volatility was estimated using 
GARCH (1,1) and EGARCH models. Each model was tested using a SUR system and 
controlling for fundamental economic factors that affect volatility. Also, the effect of 
these different positions on the spot market is tested in an attempt to observe whether 
traders could be indirectly linked to the recent food crisis and inefficient distribution of 
food worldwide. Lastly, we study the impact of volatility on traders’ positions and 
whether these positions could be used to predict market movements using Granger 
causality tests.  
Our results contradict previous empirical research that blames speculators for 
increases in agricultural commodity prices for both the spot and futures market. However, 
we find that hedgers tend to increase the corn futures contract’s price volatility, thus 
lending support to the theory of hedging pressure. Only processors and merchants change 
their positions in the corn futures market indicating that it is mainly used for hedging 
purposes while speculators in the soybean futures market tend to increase their positions 
after volatility increases. Finally, no trader category could be used to predict future 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The following table reports the descriptive statistics of all variables except traders’ positions. 
Euro is the exchange rate for the euro in dollars/euro, oil represents oil spot prices in $/barrel, NX 
represents Net Export and is measured in tons, CY represents the convenience yield. All other 
variables are measured in cents/bushel.  
 
 





Corn Spot  371.1027 351.5 695.5 198 91.96 1.012 4.51 59.62 0.001 
Corn Futures 398.673 376.375 742.25 219.5 98.15 1.10 4.53 67.89 0.001 
Soybean Spot 955.0456 952.75 1596.5 515 236.88 0.21 2.79 2.21 0.33 
Soybean Futures 968.7946 965.5 1623 537 235.86 0.31 2.86 3.84 0.14 
Oil Spot 79.21027 76.28 149.42 41.48 21.64 1.02 4.11 51.08 0.001 
Euro 1.378162 1.35995 1.5922 1.19 0.09 0.48 2.32 12.98 0.001 
NX Corn 851524.8 754436 4851059 8301 573513.8 2.52 15.37 166.47 0.001 
NX Soybean 491927.5 382147 3046570 3144 393404 1.83 10.16 60.72 0.001 
Storage Corn 7.55 7.12 18.15 0.59 4.25 0.38 2.28 10.31 0.005 
Storage Soybean 6.45 5.82 17 0.59 3.76 0.54 2.56 12.98 0.001 
CY Corn  41.91 36.7 135.38 1.55 27.03 1.12 4.58 76.19 0.001 
CY Soybean 84.2 1.4 324.71 1.84 58.91 1.41 5.47 131.94 0.001 
          
 
       Hedging Soya          53.37%     56.14%     69.87%     20.14% 
               
12.16%    -0.87    3.14      28.61       0.001 
     Hedging Corn         50.70%     51.79%    78.95% 25.55% 9.27%    -0.34    4.09    15.65     0.039 
  Speculation Corn         40.49%     41.28%     59.23% 17.48% 10.11%   -0.20    2.01    10.56     0.005 





Table 2: DCOT Trader Data 
 
The following table is divided into three different panels. Panel A represents the weekly average positions held by each category as classified by the CFTC. Panel B represents 
the weekly average positions by each trader group. Panel C shows the traders’ positions as a percentage of total long or short positions held by all traders. 
 













Long Short Spread Long Short Long Short Spread Long Short Spread 
Corn 198451.13 69618.37 72051.88 220522.71 628767.54 326738.01 8757.45 15374.74 114530.67 51957.88 87198.74 
Soybean 85411.67 24959.96 30350.70 74916.72 240089.35 126440.48 3788.26 6354.86 35641.34 22240.73 34174.57 
 
 
           













Long Short Spread Long Short Long Short Spread Long Short Spread 
Corn 2159.36 2072.86 1153.47 1020.6 1718.98 15016.96 5131.15 1108.35 785.39 547.41 627.92 




Panel C: Percent of Long and Short Positions 
 
Long Positions  
Market   Managed Money 







    Corn 
Soybean 
              23.13% 
              26.49% 
 
  
       25.56% 
       23.24% 
 
 
              37.97% 
              39.22% 
 
  
                 13.34% 
                 11.05% 
 
 
Short Positions  
Market   Managed Money 







    Corn 
Soybean 
              9.17% 
              8.57% 
 
  
       82.83% 
       82.48% 
 
 
              1.15% 
              1.3% 
 
  
                 6.84% 






 Table 3: Results of Estimation Using the GARCH Model 
Parameters/z statistics 
 
Corn Spot Corn Future Soybean Spot Soybean Future Oil Spot Euro 
   0.00033 0.001767 0.000215 4.64E-05 0.00016 0.00000818 
 
(0.984442) (3.755456)** (1.622841) (1.156523) (1.353319) (1.560277) 
   0.109108 0.053443 0.158412 0.091459 0.097082 0.154533 
 
(2.02024)* (1.321311) (2.495691)* (2.497829)** (2.341082)** (2.41473)* 
   0.795125 0.876001 0.758287 0.885105 0.849899 0.819112 
 
(5.857935)** (8.415367)** (8.351949)** (17.64525)** (12.35941)** (13.44935)** 
L 326.2907 334.7666 373.4023 403.5194 343.3847 630.9909 
LB(12) 9.8043 12.699 7.2877 5.4478 7.0339 10.332 
 
(0.633) (0.391) (0.838) (0.941) (0.855) (0.587) 
ADF -4.049208 -8.463075 -4.030593 -14.87346 -17.07127 -2.807986 
P-value   (0.0014)**   (0.001)** (0.0015)    (0.001)**     (0.001)**    (0.001)** 
KPSS 0.180173 0.166722 0.199378 0.182286 0.44014 0.44014 
              Note: *Denotes significance at 5% level and **denotes significance at 1% level. 
        
             
         
  
z-statistics are in parentheses.        is the Ljung-Box statistics to test for autocorrelation in the squared normalized residuals 
using 12 lags.   is the log-likelihood value for each estimation. ADF represents augmented Dickey Fuller test statistic to test for 

























Table 4: Results of Estimation Using The EGARCH Model 
Parameters/z statistics 
 
NX Corn NX Soybean Storage Corn Storage Soybean CY corn CY soybean 
  -0.189817 -1.736187 -0.001385 -0.088082 -0.964324 0.262312 
 
(-2.239239)* (-2.998426)** (-0.04134) (0.5258) (-5.968836)** (1.472395) 
  -0.17324 0.357384 -0.289824 -0.15929 -0.045719 -0.083634 
 
(-1.508405) (2.551342)** (-5.170691)** (0.2464) (-0.468534) (-1.850076)* 
  -0.575152 -0.416646 -0.350399 -0.685644 -1.144507 0.446633 
 
(-3.50693)** (-4.250639)** (-4.257382)** (-3.90785)** (-1.144507)** 0.985126 
  0.959229 0.716023 0.985699 0.993851 0.5716 0.366526 
 
(52.998)** (7.155872)** (149.456)** (71.72403)** (13.16429)** 0.711625 
L 336.064 250.6576 761.659 957.8272 457.0687 405.3969 
LB(12) 48.831 34.564 3.1214 100.21 6.8801 51.421 
 
(0.0001)** (0.001)** 0.21 (0.0001)** 0.23 (0.0001)** 
ADF -4.338021 -11.75474 -12.30239 -13.36873 -13.63453 -16.55567 
P-value (0.0005)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
KPSS 0.158999 0.061789 0.13501 0.053923 0.241241 (0.040127)* 
Note: *Denotes significance at 5% level and **denotes significance at 1% level. 
             
  =                 
 ) +    
     
     
 
 +     
      
     
 




z-statistics are in parentheses.        is the Ljung-Box statistics to test for autocorrelation in the squared normalized residuals 
using 12 lags.   is the log-likelihood value for each estimation. ADF represents augmented Dickey Fuller test statistic to test for 





















Table 5: Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (Corn): 
Volatility of Corn Futures: 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
    -0.029392 0.005195 -5.657471 (0.001)*** 
(L)VSR 0.502953 0.014693 34.23127 (0.001)*** 
SC 0.23188 0.083018 2.793123 (0.0055)*** 
CY 0.005281 0.00384 1.375149 0.1698 
S -0.006823 0.013477 -0.506218 0.613 
H 0.094508 0.014871 6.355017 (0.001)*** 
 
Volatility of Corn Spot: 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
    0.097489 0.007339 13.28437 (0.001)*** 
(L)VFR 0.540944 0.043539 12.42438 (0.001)*** 
OIL 0.015775 0.008912 1.770045 (0.0774)* 
Euro -0.003532 0.010974 -0.321845 0.7477 
NX -0.000291 0.004197 -0.069391 0.9447 
S 0.019363 0.019776 0.979124 0.3281 
H -0.151685 0.021712 -6.986399 (0.001)*** 
Note: *Denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***denotes significance at 1% level. 
Iterative SUR Model: 
                                                
                                                        
Lagged values for volatility of spot and futures prices were estimated using Akaike’s Final Prediction Error (FPR). 
                                                                                                      





















Table 6: Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (Soybean): 
Volatility of Soybean Futures: 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic             Prob. 
    0.013175 0.005015 2.627041 (0.0089)*** 
(L)VSR 0.644648 0.033016 19.52523 (0.001)*** 
SC -0.01715 0.102697 -0.16699             0.8675 
CY 0.111615 0.265926 0.41972             0.6749 
S -0.01075 0.022236 -0.48343              0.629 
H -0.00681 0.021771 -0.31276              0.7546 
 
Volatility of Soybean Spot: 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic               Prob. 
    -0.01446 0.00674 -2.1453 (0.0325)** 
(L)VFR 0.580944 0.043539 11.42438 (0.001)*** 
OIL 0.108609 0.031088 3.49366   (0.0005)*** 
Euro -0.01729 0.039921 -0.43315               0.6651 
NX 0.001459 0.00199 0.733312               0.4638 
S 0.030406 0.030515 0.996439               0.3196 
H 0.006917 0.03007 0.230018               0.8182 
Note: *Denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***denotes significance at 1% level. 
Iterative SUR Model: 
                                                
                                                        
Lagged values for volatility of spot and futures prices were estimated using Akaike’s Final Prediction Error (FPR). 
                                                                                                      















Table 7: Granger Causality Test Using an SUR System 
The following model is estimated across the two markets using an SUR system. The  -value is from the Wald chi-squared 
test of the null    = 0    in Panel A and    = 0   . Rejection of the null indicates that volatility leads traders’ positions in Panel A 
and traders’ positions leads volatility in Panel B. The lag structure is selected by minimizing Akaikes Information Criterion. The 
sign indicates the impact of volatilities on trader’s positions in corn and soybean markets. 
                                
                                 
 
Panel A: Volatilities Lead traders’ positions 
 
 










        
          Corn  P-value 0.55 0.1650 0.4342 0.90 0.49 0.001 0.05 0.001 
 
Sign + - + - + - - + 
          Soybean P-value 0.02 0.001 0.001 0.945 0.001 0.09 0.001 0.001 
 
Sign + + + + - + + + 
 
Panel B: Traders’ positions lead volatilities  
 
 










          Corn  P-value 0.87 0.70 0.829 0.91 0.76 0.72 0.82 0.87 
 
Sign + - + - - - - - 
          Soybean P-value 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.81 0.84 0.93 0.82 0.88 
 
Sign + - + - + - - + 
           
 
